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REGULATION OF INSURANCE-THE
STATE-FEDERAL CONTROVERSY
ALICE M. CHELLBERGTO RESIDENTS of foreign countries the division of powers be-
tween federal and state governments in the United States is no
doubt puzzling. Many residents of the U.S.-including some
lawyers-are confused on this point, as well. On the one hand they
hear the cry of states' rights, and objections to encroachment by the
federal government on the powers reserved to the states. On the other
hand they hear pleas by some states that the federal government as-
sume responsibilities-mostly financial-previously borne by the states.
These shifts of power or intrusions on authority, depending upon
the issue and the point of view, have touched many areas of our
nation's economic, social and political activity. It therefore may not
have come to the attention of those attorneys not closely connected
with the business, that the insurance industry is presently in the midst
of a state versus federal conflict of which the United States Supreme
Court will be the arbiter.
Non-insurance lawyers may or may not be vitally interested in the
practical result of this controversy, but the legal issue is one which
should interest all attorneys. From the industry point of view that
issue is: May an agency of the federal government assume regulatory
jurisdiction over the business of insurance, despite passage by Con-
gress of a law expressly designed to preserve such jurisdiction to the
states?
The federal agency involved is the Federal Trade Commission. The
aspect of the insurance business over which jurisdiction is asserted is
the advertising of companies writing accident and health insurance.
The federal statute is the McCarran Act, often referred to simply as
Public Law 15. The cases now pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court on writs of certiorari involve the American Hospital and Life
Insurance Company of San Antonio, Texas and National Casualty
MIss CHELLBERG received her B.S. and J.D. at the University of Illinois, is a member
of the American and Illinois State Bar Associations, is Chairman of the Insurance Law
Conmittee of the Chicago Bar Association and a past president of the Women's Bar
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Company of Detroit.' Another, Federal Trade Commission v. Crafts,
involving Fireman's Fund Indemnity Company of San Francisco,
went off on a procedural point and was disposed of by the Supreme
Court on October 14, 1957.2
The story behind these cases may best be dealt with chronologically.
The real starting point is subsection 3 of Section 8 of Article I of
the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power "To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." This, of course, is known as "the commerce
clause." It vests in Congress primary power to regulate interstate
commerce.
The plenary power of Congress over interstate commerce includes
the power of Congress to consent that the states regulate interstate
commerce. This doctrine of congressional consent has been followed
in many cases' and it is well settled that it is now the law. This is
evidenced by such comments as that of the late Chief Justice Stone
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington:
It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power,
may authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or
impose burdens upon it.4
Congress, in consenting to regulation of interstate commerce by
the states, does not delegate any of its powers. Hence there arises no
question of any unconstitutional delegation of congressional power.
Rather, the Congress permits the states to exercise their regulatory
laws-the police power-over interstate commerce, and to regulate,
burden or otherwise interfere with interstate commerce in ways that,
in the absence of such consent, would be forbidden.
It is an unquestioned fact that from early times insurance com-
panies have done business across state lines and therefore have been
doing an interstate business. Why, then, has there been anything other
than federal regulation over interstate insurance activities?
The answer to this question is found in the 1869 U.S. Supreme
I U.S. Supreme Court appellate docket Nos. 436 and 435.
2 244 F.2d 882 (C.A. 9th, 1957), rev'd - U.S. - (1957).
3 E.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Hooven & Allison v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
299 U.S. 334 (1937); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936); Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); In re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer),
140 U.S. 545 (1891); Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,
124 F.2d 800 (C.A. 3rd, 1941).
4 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).
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Court decision of Paul v. Virginia.' Under this decision, followed in
subsequent cases over a period of seventy-five years, the issuance of
policies of insurance was held not to be a transaction of commerce.
Not being commerce, insurance could not be interstate commerce.
State laws regulating insurance were accordingly upheld, despite the
fact that they were applied to companies domiciled in other states
and were concerned with transactions occurring across state lines.6
The result was that a vast body of state law regulating the business
of insurance was developed. Accordingly, consternation and confu-
sion were great when, in 1944, the Supreme Court reversed its pre-
vious position and held that insurance was commerce and therefore,
when conducted across state lines, interstate commerce.
7
There were two consequences of the S.E.U.A. decision which
caused particular concern to the states, the insurance industry and
the Congress. First, the grant to Congress of exclusive power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce threatened the validity of existing state
laws taxing insurance companies from which large revenues were
derived by the states. Second, the S.E.U.A. case was an anti-trust suit.
By holding the insurance business subject to the Sherman Act, a direct
conflict was created with practices long authorized or even required
by state law. For example, the laws of some states permitted or re-
quired that rates be fixed on the basis of pooled experience.
The use of pooled experience as a basis for making insurance rates
is highly desirable. In contrast to the seller of a commodity, who
knows, or can ascertain, the exact price of his product, the largest
element in an insurance rate-the loss factor-is not known in advance.
It can only be estimated on the basis of an average of what that partic-
ular coverage has cost in the past. An old and very large company,
if it has kept elaborate records and has been writing the particular
coverage for a considerable period, may be able to do a fairly accurate
job on its own. But if the company is young or small, or its records
are not extensive, it may arrive at a wrong rate. If that rate is too
high, it will not sell much business and those who do buy from it
5 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1869).
6 E.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Nutting v.
Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553 (1902); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389
(1900); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); Fire Asso. of Philadelphia v. New
York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Liverpool & L. Life & F. Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall. (U.S.)
566 (1871); Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 410 (1871).
7 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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will have paid too much. If the rate is too low and much business is
sold, insolvency of the company is apt to result and those who bought
the insurance risk catastrophe. The best way to make proper rates,
therefore, is to combine the experience of many insurers. The broader
the base, the more accurate the result. Under the Sherman Act, how-
ever, collaborative action of the type needed for insurance rate mak-
ing would be regarded as illegal price fixing.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (which is
made up of the chief state insurance administrative officials) and the
insurance industry were in agreement that an effort should be made
to strengthen and preserve state regulation of interstate insurance
activities. As a result the NAIC presented to Congress a legislative
proposal which was the basis of what in 1945 became the McCarran
Act, or Public Law 15.8 Pending a later examination of its specific
8 59 Stat. 33-34 (1945), 15 U.S.C.A. 1011-15 (1948). Since the cases herein discussed
hinge directly on an interpretation of this law, it is set out below in full text:
PUBLIC LAW 15-79th CONGRESS
[CHAPTER 20-1ST SESSION]
[S. 3401
AN ACT
To express the intent of the Congress with reference to the regulation of the business
of insurance: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress hereby declares that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed
to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
SEC. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance: Provided, That after January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890,
as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
SEc. 3. (a) Until January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act,
and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimi-
nation Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to
any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimi-
dation.
SEc. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any manner the
application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known
as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as
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provisions, it may be noted that this statute, in essence, makes the
federal anti-trust laws inapplicable to insurance to the extent that the
business is regulated by state law.
The invitation contained in the McCarran Act to oust federal reg-
ulation of insurance by passage of state laws was accepted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the several
states. In May 1945 the Committee on Federal Legislation of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners called on various
groups in the insurance business to form an All-Industry Committee
to study the problems flowing from application to the insurance busi-
ness of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. This committee, working
with the NAIC, drafted a number of model bills designed to provide
state regulation of insurance and thus prevent application of the fed-
eral anti-trust laws. One of the model laws was an "Act Relating to
Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices in the Business of Insurance." Legislation based on this so-
called "Little FTC Act" has been enacted by 41 states and Hawaii.9
Notwithstanding this legislation, or other laws already on the stat-
ute books which were deemed to serve the same purpose, the Federal
Trade Commission, in December 1953, approved a resolution author-
izing an investigation of accident and health insurance advertising. In
January 1954 all insurance companies in the United States writing
any type of accident and health insurance were requested to file
sample specimens of all advertising material of a printed or published
nature used during 1953, including radio and TV scripts. In October
1954 the FTC issued the first batch of 17 complaints, with those
issued subsequently increasing the final total to 41.
A hearing on each complaint was conducted by a hearing examiner
of the Commission. The opinions of the examiners, some of which
were very lengthy, dealt with the question of the FTC's jurisdiction,
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Mer-
chant Marine Act, 1920.
SEC. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several States, Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
SEC. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person
or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of
such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held in-
valid, shall not be affected.
Approved March 9, 1945.
9 Remaining states: California, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Oregon and Rhode
Island.
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where that issue had been raised, as well as withthe merits of the
allegations that the advertising was false and misleading.
In the Crafts case, Mr. James Crafts, president of Fireman's Fund
Insurance Company, refused to answer questions at the hearing on
the complaint against his company, on the ground that the Federal
Trade Commission had no jurisdiction. The Commission applied to
the U.S. District Court for an order requiring Mr. Crafts to testify
and to produce the documents called for in a subpoena duces tecum
issued by the FTC. The District Judge entered an order requiring
compliance with the subpoena by Mr. Crafts, who then appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
By unanimous opinion filed on February 27, 195710 the District
Court order was reversed and the Federal Trade Commission's sub-
poena was held unenforceable until it had been determined by the
courts what jurisdiction, if any, the FTC had over the business of
insurance. The court felt that the subpoena which had been served
on Mr. Crafts did not properly present the question of jurisdiction
to the District Court, and therefore ordered it quashed. Having de-
cided that the subpoena could not be enforced, the court saw no
reason to interpret Public Law 15, but did say that it was the distinct
purpose of Congress, emphatically set out in the act, "to abandon the
field of regulation to the states, where the power traditionally lay."11
On October 14, 1957 the Supreme Court, without hearing and with-
out opinion, reversed the Court of Appeals. 12 Although this action
establishes the legality of the FTC subpoena, it does not resolve the
basic question of FTC jurisdiction over insurance advertising.
In The American Hospital and Life case, the hearing examiner
ruled that of the 14 states in which the company did business the
FTC had jurisdiction in one (Mississippi) because it had no statute
forbidding deceptive and misleading advertising. The examiner found,
however, that the FTC had not established that false and misleading
statements and representations had been made by the company. Coun-
sel for the Commission appealed from this ruling. On April 24, 1956,
the Federal Trade Commission, by a 3 to 2 decision, 13 held that it had
10 Crafts v. Federal Trade Commission, 244 F.2d 882 (C.A. 9th, 1957), rev'd - U.S.
- (1957).
i Ibid., at 894.
12The Court's order cited Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943)
and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
13 American Hospital & Life Ins. Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 25,954 (F.T.C. 1956)
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jurisdiction and that the company had issued false and misleading
statements.
The American Hospital and Life Insurance Company perfected its
appeal by petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. Without passing on the merits, the court unanimously re-
versed the FTC and set aside the cease and desist order which the
Commission had issued, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. After
commenting on the purpose and effect of the McCarran Act, the
court stated:
The Commission urges that a state does not have and never did have the
power adequately to control the advertising practices of out-of-state insurance
companies doing business within its boundaries. The Congress, seemingly, had
no doubt that a state might exercise such power and we have none. The Supreme
Court, we think, has expressed the same view ... with respect to another phase
of state insurance regulation. 14
The opinion of the hearing examiner, in the National Casualty
Company case, held that four out of five categories of advertising
complained against were misleading and deceptive, and that the juris-
diction of the Commission was limited to direct mail advertising and
to all advertising in those states which had no statute regulating it.
Upon appeal the Commission, by another 3 to 2 decision issued May
21, 1956,1" held that all of the advertising complained of was decep-
tive and that the Commission had full jurisdiction over all of the
company's advertising practices irrespective of the existence of state
statutes regulating such practices.
National Casualty Company took an appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That court, in a unanimous decision,
found it unnecessary to decide the merits and held that, under the
McCarran Act, the FTC was without jurisdiction over the company's
business in those states where such business was regulated by state law.
The court set aside the Commission's cease and desist order and re-
manded the case to the FTC for further proceedings on the question
of state regulation.' 6
Petitions for writs of certiorari on the latter two cases, filed by the
Solicitor General, were granted by the United States Supreme Court
on November 12, 1957. The question which these cases put to the
14 243 F.2d 719, 724 (C.A. 5th, 1957.).
15 National Casualty Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. t 26,010 (F.T.C. 1956).
16 National Casualty Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 245 F.2d 883 (C.A. 6th,
1957).
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Supreme Court is whether the Federal Trade Commission has juris-
diction to regulate accident and health insurance advertising, despite
Public Law 15 and despite state laws regulating such practices.
It seems clear that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over
insurance advertising, whether pertaining to accident and health or
other types of insurance, when the question is viewed from any of
three aspects, namely: (1) the background and legislative history of
the McCarran Act; (2) the plain language of the Act itself; and (3)
construction of the Act by the courts, particularly the Supreme Court
of the United States.
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As previously mentioned, for seventy-five years, from 1869 to
1944, the business of insurance was regulated exclusively by the states
because of Supreme Court holdings that insurance was not commerce.
Not being commerce, it could be subject to federal regulation as
interstate commerce. This situation was changed completely when the
Supreme Court reversed itself in the South-Eastern Underwriters'7
case and held that insurance was commerce and hence, when con-
ducted across state lines, interstate commerce.
The activity of the industry and the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners which followed the S.E.U.A. decision shows
clearly that their efforts were directed towards restoring state regula-
tion. For example, in the Legislative Proposal submitted to the Con-
gress by the Executive Committee of the NAIC the "Declaration of
Policy" section of the memorandum of explanation of the proposed
text of legislation stated:
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners sincerely believes that
the states can adequately regulate the insurance business, and because of legal
considerations and the close proximity of state supervisory officials to the peo-
ple affected, are in a better position to regulate that business than the Federal
Government. In that regard it has regulatory machinery available, including
regulatory statutes and trained personnel. It is our understanding that Congress
shares this belief. It is therefore regarded as essential that Congress should de-
clare its policy and its will.
Commission Act to that business should be excluded; this, if for no other reason
The memorandum subsequently dealt specifically with Federal Trade
Commission jurisdiction as follows:
It is quite obvious that if the regulation of the insurance business is to con-
tinue in the several states, that any possible application of the Federal Trade
17 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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Commission Act to that business should be excluded; this, if for no other reason
than that the states can satisfactorily perform the functions which the Commis-
sion might be called upon or elect to exercise.
That the Congress did share- the belief of the Insurance Commis-
sioners that regulation of the business of insurance should be returned
to the states is clearly evidenced by many passages from the debate on
Public Law 15. An example is found in the following statement by
Senator Ferguson, one of the sponsors of the bill:
It is clear what we intended to do. After a conference with the House, we
believed that the States should regulate insurance, and taxation on the insur-
ance business.18
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF PUBLIC LAW 15
It is evident that Congress was urged by the industry and the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners to restore to the states
the authority to regulate the business of insurance which the South-
Eastern Underwriters decision had taken away. It also is clear that the
Congress in enacting Public Law 15, which followed in substance the
NAIC legislative proposal, believed it was returning the regulation of
insurance to the states. This intent is not only implicit in the enact-
ment of Public Law 15 because of its background, but also is clearly
stated in the act itself.
It will be noted that in the first section of the McCarran Act Con-
gress declared that "continued regulation and taxation by the several
states of the business of insurance is in the public interest." In Section
2 (a) it is stated forthrightly that "The business of insurance and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."
In Section 2 (b) Congress specifically provided that the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act should
be applicable to the business of insurance but only "to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State law." In Section 3 Congress
provided a moratorium-an adjustment period during which applica-
tion of the anti-trust laws was to be suspended as regards the business
of insurance, whether state laws on the subject existed or not-and
then provided that at all times and under all conditions the Sherman
Act should apply to insurance with respect to acts or agreements of
boycott, coercion or intimidation.
The question has been raised from time to time as to why Congress
18 91 Cong. Rec. 1551-1552 (Feb. 27, 1945).
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did not provide an outright exemption from the anti-trust laws, ex-
cept for boycott, coercion and intimidation, and let it go at that.
The answer is that Congress realized that some of the states might
not avail themselves to the fullest extent of the rights granted them
under Sections 1 and 2 (a) to regulate insurance. Therefore, to en-
courage state regulation and to prevent a gap in the regulatory sys-
tem, at least as far as interstate insurance activities were concerned,
the Congress provided for application of the federal anti-trust laws to
insurance if the states did not regulate, but to the latter extent only.
If this is not the clear meaning of the clause that the federal laws "shall
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such busi-
ness is not regulated by State law," then it is difficult to ascribe any
meaning to it whatsoever.
CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC LAW 15 BY THE COURTS
The issue of whether, through the McCarran Act, Congress effec-
tively consented to regulation by the states of interstate insurance
activities has been answered in the affirmative by the courts.
In Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin1" the U.S. Supreme
Court held squarely that the intent, and effect, of Public Law 15 was
to give the states the power to burden interstate commerce through
regulation or taxation. The Court could hardly have used clearer lan-
guage on this point than the following:
Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This was
done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be thought
to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise
expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by
declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation
of this business is in the public interest and that the business and all who engage
in it "shall be subject to" the laws of the several states in these respects.
Moreover, in taking this action Congress must have had full knowledge of the
nation-wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation; of the fact that
they differ greatly in the scope and character of the regulations imposed and of
the taxes exacted; and of the further fact that many, if not all, include features
which, to some extent, have not been applied generally to other interstate busi-
ness. Congress could not have been unacquainted with these facts and its purpose
was evidently to throw the whole weight of its power behind the state systems,
notwithstanding these variations.
... It clearly put the full weight of its power behind existing and future state
legislation to sustain it from any attack under the commerce clause to whatever
extent this may be done with the force of that power behind it, subject only to
the exceptions expressly provided for.20
20 328 U.S. 408, 429-431 (1946).19 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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The above holding was followed in North Little Rock Transporta-
tion Company v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange,2' where the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said:
The purpose of the McCarran Act was to permit the States to continue the
regulation of the business of insurance, unhampered, to the extent provided by
the Act, by federal legislation relating to interstate commerce.
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated its views in Wilburn Boat Co.
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company by stating, after a reference to
the South-Eastern Underwriters case:
The measure Congress passed shortly thereafter, known as the McCarran Act,
was designed to assure that existing state power to regulate insurance would
continue.
22
CLAIM OF JURISDICTION BY FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
It has been demonstrated that the background and legislative his-
tory of the McCarran Act, the plain language of the Act itself and
the interpretation given it by the Supreme Court, all manifest an un-
mistakable intention to leave regulation of the business of insurance to
the states and preclude federal jurisdiction except for boycott, coer-
cion or intimidation, to which the Sherman Act remains applicable.
It may seem surprising, therefore, that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion is asserting jurisdiction over insurance advertising. The only an-
swer is that the reasoning of the FTC majority in The American Hos-
pital and Life opinion (followed in the National Casualty Company
case) was fallacious and some of their authorities irrelevant.
The Commission majority construed Public Law 15 as intending to
permit the states to regulate only the intrastate aspects of insurance,
with reservation of federal authority over interstate activities. This
ignores all facts and precedents and makes Public Law 15 a nullity.
No distinction between intrastate and interstate transactions in in-
surance appears anywhere in the McCarran Act. The background and
legislative history of the law show clearly that when Congress re-
ferred to "continued regulation and taxation by the several states" it
had reference to regulation and taxation as applied prior to the South-
Eastern Underwriters case. It is incontrovertible that such regulation
and taxation included both inter- and intrastate aspects of insurance.
The proviso in Section 2 (b) that the federal acts are to apply to in-
surance "to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law"
21 181 F.2d 174, 176 (C.A. 8th, 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 823 (1950).
22348 U.S. 310, 319 (1955).
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is made meaningless by the FTC interpretation. The Supreme Court's
holding in the Prudential case that by Public Law 15 Congress gave
permission to the states to tax and regulate interstate insurance trans-
actions is completely ignored. There is no mention of that case what-
soever in the FTC majority opinions.
The fallacy of the Commission's contention that the McCarran Act
had no effect whatsoever on its jurisdiction over insurance is further
emphasized by Section 4 of the statute. It provides that nothing in the
Act shall "affect in any manner" the application to the insurance busi-
ness of the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards
Act or the Merchant Marine Act. If Congress had intended the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act to be on the same footing and applicable
to insurance irrespective of state law, surely it would have been in-
cluded in Section 4, rather than elsewhere in the Act.
That concurrent state-federal jurisdiction was not contemplated by
the McCarran Act can be demonstrated in another way, also. Section
2 (b) puts the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act on the same footing in that each is to be applicable
to insurance only to the extent that such business is not regulated by
state law. As previously mentioned, it was recognized immediately
after the S.E.U.A. decision that existing state laws and practices, par-
ticularly as to insurance rate making, were in direct conflict with the
Sherman Act. What was required, authorized or permitted under state
laws would constitute illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act. This
fact was clearly pointed out in the memorandum which accompanied
the legislative proposal submitted to Congress in November 1944 by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Congress was
therefore aware of the conflict and obviously intended to resolve it by
exemption from Sherman Act to the extent that the business of insur-
ance is regulated by state law. If concurrent jurisdiction was not in-
tended as between state laws and the Sherman Act, it was not intended
as between state laws and the Federal Trade Commission Act, because
there is nothing in the McCarran Act that requires or permits any
distinction or difference in application of the two federal statutes.
That the Sherman Act is ousted by state rate regulatory laws was
the holding in North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty
23Reciprocal Exchange, on which writ of certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court. The only logical corollary will be a
23 181 F.2d 174 (C.A. 8th, 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 823 (1950).
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holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act is similarly ousted by
state laws governing insurance advertising.
STATE LAWS EFFECT OUSTER OF FTC ACT
We have seen that the McCarran Act provided that the Federal
anti-trust laws, including the Federal Trade Commission Act, should
be applicable to the business of insurance only to the extent that such
business is not regulated by state law.
It has been claimed by some that confusion exists as to what Con-
gress meant, in the McCarran Act, by "regulated by state law." This
confusion, if such there be, disappears when it is understood that any
warnings which were voiced to the effect that the state regulation
which was necessary under Public Law 15 must be "affirmative" or
"effective" regulation were not expressions of opinion as to the legal
effect of state regulatory statutes, but rather were warnings of further
legislative action which would likely be taken by Congress if the
states failed to take advantage of their opportunity under the McCar-
ran Act to pass the necessary licensing and regulatory legislation.
A clear expression of the concept that enactment of state law, of
itself, accomplishes an ouster (to the extent of the enactment), is
found in the following exchange between Senator McCarran and
Senator Murdock which occurred during the course of debate on
Public Law 15:
MR. MCCARRAN: ... Regulatory acts must be enacted by the several States in
each of the several States. Otherwise the anti-trust acts become effective after
January 1, 1948....
MR. MURDOCK: And it is intended that on the expiration of the moratorium
the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the other acts mentioned will again be-
come effective except-
MR. MCCARRAN: Except as the States themselves have provided regulations....
MR. PEPPER: ... [Reading Section 2.] Does that mean that after January 1,
1948, the States may determine whether or not the Sherman and the other acts
become applicable to the business of insurance?
MR. MCCARRAN: The answer to that question is "Yes." During the 3-year
moratorium the states may, if they see fit to do so, enact legislation for the pur-
pose of regulation. If they do enact such legislation, to the extent that they
regulate they will have taken the business of insurance in the respective states
out from under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Clayton Act, and the other
acts.24 [Italics added.]
In another part of the debate Senator Ferguson and Senator Barkley
voiced the two concepts that are fundamental to an understanding of
24 91 Cong. Rec. 1471 (Feb. 26, 1945).
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the McCarran Act: (1) legislation by the staes ousts the federal
statutes; (2) failure of the states to do an effective administrative job
carried the hazard of further congressional action, but not an auto-
matic inflow of federal statute or administrative agency.
MR. FERGUSON: ... In other words, under the terms of the bill, there are six
things on which a state could not legislate. They are boycott, coercion, or in-
timidation, or agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate. But with respect to
anything else, if the states were specifically to legislate upon a particular point,
and that legislation were contrary to the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or the
Federal Trade Commission Act, then the State law would be binding. That is
exactly what we attempted to do in the bill. It is clear what we intended to do.
After a conference with the House, we believed that the States should regulate
insurance, and taxation on the insurance business. But we spelled out certain
things on which we thought Congress should not allow the States to legislate.
Those are the things which I have mentioned. As to the others, the State has full
power to act by legislation-not by agreement but by legislative act.25 [Italics
added.]....
MR. BARKLEY: . . . But I wish it to be understood that in voting for the ap-
proval of the conference report, I am accepting the interpretation placed upon
it by the conferees, namely, that if any State, through its legislature, undertakes
to go through the form of regulation merely in order to put insurance companies
within that State on an island of safety from congressional regulation, that effort
will be futile, and not only can Congress deal with any phase of the insurance
business not dealt with by a State legislature, but even in a case in which a State
Legislature deals with any phase of it, but does not deal with it adequately in the
opinion of Congress, Congress is not in any way barred by the conference re-
port from dealing with that subject and with the phase of it which Congress
deems to have been inadequately dealt with by the State; so that hereafter we
can enact such legislation as we may deem proper and wise to have enacted in
connection with the regulation of this business, which clearly is interstate com-
merce. 26 [Italics added.]
Although Congress made ouster of federal law, under the McCar-
ran Act, conditional upon state legislation, it did not in any way
qualify the latter term. Simple language was used: ". . . to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law." There can be no
confusion as to what was meant by this phrase if attention is given to
the true meaning of the word "law."
The uniform view of the common-law authorities has been that
"law" is a body of rules, detached from the enforcement process.2 7
Pollock points out that the conception of law, many of its ideas and
25 91 Cong. Rec. 1551-1552 (Feb. 27, 1945).
2091 Cong. Rec. 1558 (Feb. 27, 1945).
27 Consult Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, Titles 1, 2 (1754); Stone, Law
and Its Administration 3 (1934); 1 Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest Upon States of the American Union 183 (8th ed., 1927); Pollock, A First
Book of Jurisprudence 23-29 (1911).
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much of its form are prior in history to official intervention of the
state to maintain law. Mr. Justice Story stated it as follows:
The laws of a State are more usually understood to mean the rules and enact-
ments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established
local customs having the force of laws.2 8
It will be seen, therefore, that under Public Law 15 the enactment
by a state of a law which regulates some aspect of the insurance busi-
ness is, of itself, sufficient to effect ouster of the federal anti-trust laws
as far as their application to the particular subject is concerned.
Although a few states have not enacted the model Fair Trade Prac-
tice Act which was drafted by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and the industry for the express purpose of constitut-
ing state regulation of a kind which would oust Federal Trade Com-
mission jurisdiction, all states have laws of some type under which in-
surance advertising is regulated. It is therefore submitted that jurisdic-
tion of the FTC is ousted under the McCarran Act in all 48 states and
the District of Columbia.2
The fact that some of the state regulatory laws were enacted subse-
quent to 1953, when the acts and practices on which the FTC com-
28 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 17, 41 U.S. 1, 17 (1842).
29 Consult: Ala. Code (1940) c. 28, §§ 26, 28; Ariz. Code c. 61, §§ 61-3301 to 61-3316;
Ark. Stats. Ann. (1947) c. 66, § 17; Calif. Ins. Code (1955) §§ 780, 782, 783.5; Colo. Rev.
Stats. (1953) Chap. 72, art. 15, §§ 72-15-1 to 72-15-13; Conn. Gen. Stats. (1949) §§ 2816d
to 2821d; Del. Code (1953) Tit. 18, c. 1, §§ 531 to 538; D.C. Code (1951) §§ 22-1411,
22-1413, 35-1306, 35-1340; Fla. Stats. (1943) Tit. 35, c. 643, §§ 643.01 to 643.13; Ga. Code(1953) Tit. 56, c. 56-4A, 5§ 56-401a to 56-413a; Hawaii Rev. L., §§ 8553.01 to 8533.14;
Idaho Code (1948) §§ 41-1204, 41-1206; 111. Rev. Stats. (1953) c. 73, § 761; Bums' Ind.
Stats. Ann. (1952) §§ 39-5301 to 39-5318; Iowa Code (1949) §§ 507B.1 to 507B.13; Kan.
Gen. Stats. (1949) c. 40, §§ 40-2401 to 40-2413; Ky. Rev. Stats. (1956) §§ 304.924 to
304.945; La. Rev. Stats. (1950) §§ 22:1211 to 22:1217; Me. Rev. Stats. (1954) c. 60, §§ 146
to 158; Md. Code (1951) c. 48A, § § 321 to 335; Mass. Gen. L. (1955) c. 176D; Mich.
Stats. Ann. (1957) §§ 24.567(71) to 24.567 (85); Minn. Stats. (1946) §§ 72.20 to 72.33;
Miss. L. (1956) c. 329; Mo. Rev. Stats. (1953) c. 28, §§ 561.660, 375.230; Mont. Rev. Code
(1947) §§ 94-1819, 40-1106; Neb. Rev. Stats. (1952) Art. 15, c. 44, §§ 44-1501 to 44-1521;
Nev. Comp. L. (1957) §§ 3656.48a to 3656.48i; N.H. Rev. Stats. Ann. (1955) c. 417; N.J.
Stats. Ann. (1939) c. 17, §§ 17:29B-1 to 17:29B-14; N.M. Stats. Ann. (1953) §§ 58-9-9 to
58-9-19; N.Y. Consol. L. Chap. 28, art. IX-D, §§ 270 to 280; N.C. Gen. Stats. (1950)§§ 58-54.1 to 58-54.13; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§ 26-1011, 26-1012, 26-1014; Ohio Rev.
Code (1954) c. 39, §§ 3901.19 to 3901.23; Okla. Stats. (1953) c. 36, §§ 117.1 to 117.13; Ore.
Rev. Stats. (1955) c. 56, § 736.608; Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann. (1953) c. 40, §§ 1151 to 1162;
R. I. Gen. L. (1938) c. 612, § 54; c. 151, § 23; S. C. Code (1952) Tit. 37, c. 14, §§ 37-1201
to 37-1223; S.D. Code (1939) c. 31, §§ 31.11AOI to 31.11A08; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955)
Tit. 56, c. 12, §§ 56-1201 to 56-1213; Tex. Ins. Code (1952) S 1.10(7), Tex. Pen. Code,
c. 11, §§ 573, 580b; Utah Code Ann. (1953) c. 31, §§ 31-27-1, 31-27-4, 31-27-9; Vt. L.(1955) Act 174; Michie's Va. Code (1950) §§ 38.1-49 to 38.1-57; Wash. Rev. Code (1952)§ § .30.01, .30.04, .30.09; Michie's W. Va. Code (1955) § § 3472 (68) to 3472 (82); Wis. Stats.
(1957) §§ 207.01 to 207.13; Wyo. Comp. Stats. (1945) §§ 52-1501 to 52-1511.
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plaints are based are alleged to have taken place, is unimportant. The
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission must exist at the time
of the entry of its order. The law governing such a situation is clearly
expressed in United Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission as fol-
lows:
And since the power of the Federal Trade Commission is purely regulatory
and not punitive, it is clear that jurisdiction must exist at the time of the entry
of its order. Jurisdiction at the time of the commission of acts objected to as
unfair trade practices or at the time of the filing of the complaint with regard
thereto is not sufficient; for the order to be entered does not relate to past prac-
tices or determine rights as of the time of the filing of the complaint, as in an ac-
tion at law, but commands or forbids action in the future.8 0
And in Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Com-
mission the court said:
As the orders of the Commission are purely remedial and preventative, the
effect thereof is entirely in the future. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission should, in this respect, be measured as of the time of the order rather
than as of the filing of the complaint or as of the hearing thereon. 31
CONCLUSIONS
The Congress has the power to permit the states to regulate inter-
state commerce. The states have long had power to regulate and have
long regulated interstate commerce in insurance. By enacting the Mc-
Carran Act, Congress permitted the states to continue to regulate in-
surance in both its interstate and intrastate aspects. In accordance with
that consent, the laws of all states regulate the insurance business, in-
cluding advertising practices relating to the sale of accident and health
insurance. Concurrent state-federal regulation of insurance was not
contemplated, or provided for, under the McCarran Act. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission, therefore, has no jurisdiction over insurance
advertising, relating to accident and health or otherwise, and the
United States Supreme Court has ample authority on which to so
hold.
30 110 F.2d 473, 475 (C.A. 4th, 1940).
31 13 F.2d 673, 685 (C.A. 8th, 1926).
